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The Food Industry in Brazil: 
Towards a Restructuring? 
Introduction 
By analysing a country's food consumption patterns it is possible to derive 
much information on the performance of its food system. The relationship 
between individuals and food is continuous. Also, the handling of foodstuffs 
- from purchase to consumption - is routine for most humans. In this way, 
habits are developed that define a particular cultural pattern for a society. 
It is often said that eating is a cultural action, even if only for advertising 
reasons. In this sense, the circumstances surrounding food purchase and 
consumption are directly linked to our culture. Moreover, as a dynamic 
process, the linkage occurs in both directions: we not only consume food 
according to our culture, but also our culture is shaped by our food habits. 
This may be especially true for Brazilian culture. What can be said about 
a country in which two out of three families are undernourished or live in a 
chronic state of hunger? In the same way, what can we say about a country 
which spends US$16.5 billion each year on food consumed outside the home, 
contributing to a huge fast-food industry? These are some features of 
Brazilian culture. 
Brazil is a country in which urbanisation has progressed rapidly. 
Nowadays, less than 25 % of its population lives in rural areas. Most families, 
even those at the lowest income level, have a refrigerator, gas cooker and 
TV. The higher classes own more sophisticated devices, such as microwave 
ovens and freezers. In other words, the Brazilian consumption pattern is 
typically urban. 
In Brazil, responsibility for the purchase and preparation of food is mostly 
taken by women. However, with the industrialisation of the economy, more 
women have joined the labour force and work outside home. At present 
women comprise almost 50% of the labour force. Nonetheless, women are 
still expected to provide food for the family's consumption; this is made 
possible in two alternative or complementary ways: by working extra hours 
at home or by purchasing more convenience meals. The Brazilian food 
industry reflects those trends. In fact, it has followed 'step-by-step' those 
tendencies, even possibly setting the trends itself. 
The trajectory of the modern Brazilian food industry began after World 
War II. Before that, it was possible to observe the presence of industrial 
capital only in a few sectors in order to complement the food supply to the 
increasingly urban population. Finally, in the late 1940s and early 1950s, 
Brazil's food industry boomed. This new phase was based on the diffusion of 
fordism as a production and consumption paradigm. The modernisation of 
agriculture and distribution of food products sponsored by governments of the 
period provided the leverage for this phase. 
In the 1980s a new phase of the food industry emerged. New sources of 
capital arose, new fields of investment appeared and Brazilian companies 
merged with foreign companies. At the same time, in the developed 
countries, changes have led to a concentration of suppliers, with increasing 
participation of the financial sector. Also, on the demand side, market 
segmentation has been stressed, reflected in the production of more value-
added items. 
This paper describes the worldwide food industry's new phase - called 
post-fordist - and its current effects on Brazil. Given the deep changes in the 
worldwide food industry, what is going to happen in Brazil? Are the great 
social contrasts and the Brazilian market features compatible with the pattern 
of modernity that comes from abroad? These are some themes which are 
analysed in the following sections. 
This paper is divided into five sections, followed by a conclusion. Section 
II describes the origins of the food industry in Brazil. The objective of this 
analysis is to review the agro-industrial sector formation and capital 
participation in this process. The third section discusses the performance of 
agro-industry, chiefly food production, in the context of Brazilian heavy 
industrialisation in the post-war era. The fourth section presents the latest 
movements in the Brazilian food system, emphasising the differences between 
the present sector and its predecessor, which belonged to the first 
industrialisation boom. The fifth section stresses the main aspects of the 
restructuring of the food industry in the developed countries. Finally, the 
conditions in Brazil are assessed in relation to the new configuration of the 
worldwide food industry. 
The Origins of the Brazilian Food Industry 
The first agro-processing activity in Brazil was that of the colonial era: 
molasses and raw sugar exports from sugarcane. After the decline of the 
colonial sugarcane export boom, this activity was revived after 200 years 
with the birth of Brazilian industrialisation in the third quarter of the 
nineteenth century. As will be shown, besides sugar Brazil already had 
important textile, food and related product industries at the end of the 
nineteenth century. Thus, the presence of food processing in Brazil is 
centuries old. 
However, a radical change has taken place in food processing in recent 
decades. The Brazilian agro-industry of the 1970s and 1980s has little in 
common with that found early in the century. In the past, agro-industry had 
been an extension of mercantile or agrarian capital.1 In recent times, these 
linkages occurred in the reverse way: from financial and industrial capital 
backwards to agriculture. In other words, the current food industry is not a 
continuation of that of the last century. 
Many authors have worked on the origins of the Brazilian industrialisation 
process, stressing the dominance of two types of capitalists: importers and 
coffee producers, which in some cases were the same.2 The first performed 
the commercial service, keeping in contact with the main suppliers of capital 
goods and consumer goods in Europe and the United States. Knowing the 
market and the main producers, these importers were valuable in supplying 
proficiency and knowledge to new enterprises. In this almost spontaneous 
way, an import substitution process took place in the perishable goods sector. 
On the other hand, the coffee producers' capital was not only deployed in 
the coffee plantations, but also in some commercial and industrial businesses. 
Contrary to common sense, the diversification from coffee was not a strategy 
of bad years, but a form of expansion in periods of supernormal profits. 
Prado Jr. (1970, p. 264) shows, for instance, that from 1907, due to 
government constraints, the expansion of growing areas had ceased and, 
consequently, a huge amount of capital was relocated into the industrial 
sector. Given the lack of a structured financial market and the high profits 
due to coffee's good years, the farmers had exhausted their possibilities of 
investing in their crops or buying land, railway shares, etc. In this sense the 
supernormal profits spilled over into industrial activities. 
Added to this process was the presence of a class of immigrants. A newly 
arrived bourgeoisie brought a considerable amount of capital - stocks of 
commonly imported goods, for example - and settled down as brokers and 
dealers. Many immigrants could be classified as importers as well, although 
they had their own peculiarities. Further, these capitalists launched 
themselves into the industrial domain. 
To sum up, the first boom in Brazilian industrialisation, which took place 
in the last century, could be considered as a diversification based on 4a 
dynamic of mercantile and financial expansion' (Reiss, 1983, p. 97). The 
capital of individuals - that of farmers and importers - was linked backwards 
and forwards. Because of the absence of a mature financial system and few 
investment opportunities, the same farmers became involved with more 
advanced production phases, such as processing coffee and other primary 
products; importers, on the other hand, became involved with earlier 
production phases by promoting the supply-side. 
According to Wilson Cano (1977, p. 129) farmers invested their profits in 
industry in two ways: directly in factories, and indirectly though banks.3 
Until the third quarter of the nineteenth century, the role of the 'natural 
economy' was strong in terms of food self-sufficiency on the slave farms. 
Each farm was an almost autarchic unit; there was no labour division and no 
monetarisation of contracts. A large number of activities took place inside 
each farm, such as the production of rustic clothes, tools, carts and even 
rudimentary machines. Based on Rangel,4 Paim called this type of 
organisation the Rural Complex.5 This phase lasted a long time and was 
directly related to the level of preferential duties on imported British clothes 
that inhibited the development of a national industry. 
... it was best for farmers to redirect their slaves from the innumerable existing 
farm workshops to rural activities, gradually purchasing in town, at lower 
prices, products that formerly were produced in these workshops (Paim, 1957, 
p. 46).6 
In fact, the development of Brazilian industry was not an expansion of Rural 
Complex workshop production. Figures produced by research on Brazilian 
industrialisation show that its national industry had a different origin. In 
order to supply a rising urban market, competitive with foreign clothing 
imports, the infant Brazilian textile industry brought machinery from Europe 
and set up large processing units. 
According to Paim, in the 1872 census fewer than two thousand workers 
were employed in the Brazilian textile factories in towns and cities, compared 
with four hundred thousand textile workers employed inside farms or small 
villages (1957, p. 64). The 1907 census registered nearly 52,000 workers in 
the urban industry; the rural factories no longer had any importance. The 
progress of the new Brazilian textile industry was remarkable. Dean points 
out that in the case of the textile industry, 'of the nine cotton mills erected in 
the 1870s and 1880s, all were sturdily profitable. Still more were built in the 
city of Sao Paulo. By 1903, there were thirteen mills employing 2,910 looms' 
(1969, p. 38).7 
In most cases, the handicraft industry inside the Rural Complex was 
stationary, unable to compete with the large apparatus appearing in towns. As 
has been shown, the origin of this urban manufacturing is related to the 
commercial capital personified by the farmer, the comissario - the coffee 
dealer - and the coffee growers' bank. In periods of expansion, when the 
profitability of coffee increased, the coffee capital spilled over towards urban 
activities supported by the government's protectionist policy.8 
According to Prado Jr. (1970, p. 261) World War I gave a great boost to 
these industrial activities. A depreciated exchange rate not only blocked the 
imports of many industrial goods, but also allowed Brazil to export to a huge 
international market which was under-supplied due to the war. 
A new wave of investments also arose at the end of World War I based on 
a spell of good years for coffee. Suzigan has pointed out that 'the cotton 
oilseed industry received new investment in 1920-21 when seven oil factories 
and one central factory and refinery were established by only one company' 
(1986, p. 87). Moreover, the early Brazilian meat processors, the first 
cement factory and other new enterprises were direct results of the coffee 
valorisation programme, while a fragile monetary expansion occurred in 
1922-23. The overall effect of these policies was a remarkable appreciation 
of the exchange rate and, combined with the trade difficulties imposed by the 
war, they were the main causes of the birth of such important industries as 
paper and shoes, led by traditional importers. 
From 1929, in the period of deep economic crisis, coffee capital was 
released from the new capitalist ventures, becoming fully independent. 
Purchasing cheap, secondhand equipment from abroad, factory owners were 
able to expand far beyond the limits of their original coffee capital. 
According to Cardoso de Mello, the consumer goods industry, which 
emerged as the single largest industry, came about because 'the technology 
was relatively elementary, easy to handle and self-contained in the equipment 
available in the international market. Also the plant size and the initial 
investment were easily suitable to the Brazilian economy of that time' (1975, 
p. 162). As a result of all these factors, in fewer than twenty years Brazil 
began production in roughly all sectors of light industry, as well as in some 
intermediate and capital goods, such as the railway supplies industry. 
The primary characteristic of Brazilian agro-industry at the beginning of 
this century was its mercantile basis. Indeed, until World War I the main 
source of capital invested in industry was the indigenous commercial capital, 
given that foreign investment was almost nonexistent and there was little 
reinvestment of profits from industrial capital.9 The agro-industry that was 
revived in the 1950s, however, and which accompanied a new and 
consolidated durable goods sector and a new urban society, was not simply 
a continuation of the previous agro-industry. The intensive and extensive 
import substitution process, which began in the 1930s, and the heavy 
industrialisation of the 1950s, contributed greatly to a new configuration of 
the old industry. 
According to Tavares (1977, p. 76), between 1929 and 1938, imports of 
consumer goods fell 70%. This led to an import substitution process in 
elementary goods - food, drink and other consumables - that, given the level 
of urbanisation, was stimulated by market dynamism.10 Padis (1977, p.238) 
writes: 'The 1929 crisis, having promoted a general decrease in prices, led 
to a fall in the import capacity of traditional Latin American countries'.11 
From the 1930s crisis until 1948, the import substitution policy developed 
smoothly. The process worked on many levels, but in different ways. 
(In Brazil) it was almost impossible to have an industrialisation process that 
moved smoothly from the base to the top of the production pyramid - that is, 
starting with less elaborate consumer goods and going, slowly, until it reached 
capital goods (Tavares, 1977, p. 46).12 
Here, the modernisation of traditional sectors and the subsequent import 
substitution could not take place without forcing the emergence of capital 
goods, intermediate and durable goods. These bottlenecks were obstacles to 
sustainable and endogenous economic growth. 
The modernisation of light industries such as food, textiles and pulp and 
paper required a wider and firmer basis. The account given by Pires and 
Bielschowsky (1978) of the dairy industry of the 1940s reflects the period's 
agro-industrial conditions. Milk processing and its market expansion were 
blocked due to the lack of basic equipment. Some equipment such as 
pasteurisers, tanks and creamers were produced in Brazil only in the 1950s; 
others, such as powdered milk and cheese-making equipment, only in the 
1960s. 
The broadening of industry was taking place at the same time that 
agriculture took a new form. In fact, from the 1940s agriculture and agro-
industry accompanied the growth of further industrial sectors. There is no 
evidence that these primary-based industrial sectors spurred the growth of the 
other sectors; on the contrary, agro-industry in general was directly 
dependent on imported machines, equipment and inputs supplies. 
Agriculture's dependence on such equipment was particulary strong given the 
standards and regularity of raw materials required (see Kageyama, 1990, p. 
48). 
With the new linkages between agriculture and industry developing in the 
1950s and 1960s, industry started to create new products, which were much 
more uniform and were produced in a regular flow. A new articulation of 
agriculture and industry, very different from that known earlier in the 
century, began to develop. 
At first, articulation moved forward, from agriculture to industry, through 
a vertical integration of agrarian and mercantile capital. The 1960s saw a 
distinct change. Industrial sources of capital, many of them transnational and 
taking advantage of the federal government's policy, were established in the 
consumer goods sector. From this base, the new capital pursued links with 
agriculture, selling capital goods for agriculture and other inputs. In contrast 
to the generally anarchic nature of capitalism, the Brazilian state pointed the 
way, which industry then followed. 
In conclusion, it is important to underline that these early industries were 
distinct from modern agro-industry. The reasons for early industry's failure 
to gain a foothold are diverse and require a wide analysis of both the 
Brazilian and the worldwide economy at the turn of the century (see Cardoso 
de Mello, 1975). Here it is enough to say that from this first industrial boom 
based on non-durable goods, processing activities underwent slow changes. 
However, the durable and capital goods sectors changed quickly, reaching an 
almost complete form of industrial economy in the 1950s and 1960s. 
The leading factor in this new articulation of agriculture and industry was 
the involvement of the state through its management and public policies 
instituted in the 1960s. From that point, the links between agriculture and 
industry relied on regulation by the government and major sectorial interest 
groups. 
Growth Without Deepening 
At the end of World War II new market opportunities opened for US industry 
in Europe. US companies expanded their overseas capital investments by 
entering countries that had been devastated by the war. Opportunities were 
seen in both directions: traditional European firms started to see in Latin 
America an area sheltered from the US commercial advance. This movement 
led to the establishment in Brazil - in the late 1940s and 1950s - of many 
divisions of European companies which, together with United States firms, 
introduced in Brazil the modern processed food industry.13 
This new and more advanced form taken by the internationalisation of capital 
- the financial conglomerate - was manifested through the penetration of US 
companies in Canada, the United Kingdom and continental Europe taking 
advantage of post-war reconstruction programmes. Their considerable financial 
advantages menaced the stability of European companies that were forced to 
accept this challenge by moving to a new territory that would, perhaps, be 
more favourable. One could explain in this way the export of European capital 
[to Brazil] and the relative disinterest of US large companies, which were 
much more interested in the solid and promising European markets, where 
their participation had been relatively small (Cardoso de Mello, 1975, p. 127). 
According to Candal (1977, p. 245), Brazilian industrialisation did not occur 
in the classic form of intensified mass consumption, as it did in Europe. The 
first phase of Brazilian industrialisation - based on traditional goods 
consumption - remained stable for a long period. At the same time, industry 
was not diversified until the 1920s due to the erratic and selective policy on 
imports. 
The 1930s crisis followed by World War II and the intensive process of 
capital internationalisation led to an expansion of Brazilian industry. Not 
surprisingly, agro-industry had lost ground to other industrial sectors. The 
textile and food segments contributed more than 50% of the industrial gross 
product during the first half of the twentieth century (Tavares, 1977, p.92). 
Nevertheless, from the end of World War II heavy foreign and state 
investments in sectors producing durable goods led to increasing 
diversification of industry, reducing the importance of the textile and food 
industries. 
A limited comparison using official data from the first half of this century 
reveals that in relative terms agro-industry lost ground to other industrial 
sectors. According to Muller (1981, p. 47): ' . . . it has been stated that the 
agroindustrial sectors reached a participation ceiling in the 1950s, which 
subsequently declined'. Indeed, an analysis of the 1985 industrial census data 
shows that the agro-industry share in the total industrial product remained at 
the level of 24.5% (see table I).14 However, internally there were many 
changes in the agro-industry. A new economic structure arose in the early 
1960s, with oligopolistic forms emerging in agro-industry. At the same time, 
foreign capital infiltrated some hegemonic areas belonging to national 
companies. 
Table I 
Brazil: Share of Agro-Industry in Total Industry (1960-1985) (%) 
1960 1970 1980 1985 
Number of establishments 33.4 30.5 32.7 35.7 
Number of workers 21.1 19.8 21.5 29.7 
Value added 30.8 25.4 24.4 24.5 
Sources: Muller (1981, p. 46) and FIBGE (1990) 
A comparison of the capital composition of all agro-industrial sectors in 
recent decades with the composition of this capital in the import substitution 
phase reveals important changes. The old agro-industrial capital was 
completely replaced by a new capital - national or foreign - having a new 
competitive pattern, based on oligopolist practices. 
The post-war years might be characterised by the abundance of new 
sources of capital that started to operate in new areas of food industry. This 
new expansion cycle had the following features: 
i) The spread of US consumption patterns based on canned food and 
semi-processed meals. 
The great marketing effort to introduce new consumption habits was 
well rewarded by the diffusion of the so-called 'US way of l ife\ The 
penetration of advertising through new media channels was instrumental 
to the success of this US 'raid'. 
ii) The dissemination of new food retailing equipment relying on self-
service procedures. 
The first supermarket, Supermarket Sirva-se or 'help yourself, was 
established in Sao Paulo in 1953 by foreign tobacco group Souza 
Cruz.15 In the same year, in the industrial town of Sao Jose dos 
Campos, another supermarket was opened, managed by one of the 
biggest textile companies - Tecelagem Paraiba. In the former Brazilian 
capital, Rio de Janeiro, the first supermarkets were established in 1955; 
one of them - SU-CO Supermarket - benefited from US expertise. After 
ten years, Brazil's supermarkets had more than 1,000 points-of-sale. 
Today the supermarket business is the main activity of Brazil's 
commercial sector. According to Superhiper magazine - the official 
publication of the supermarket owners' association - in 1989 the 
industry had a turnover of 4.6% of Brazilian GNP and employed 
538,000 people in 33,801 shops. The industry is also responsible for 
80% of food supplies in Brazil.16 Figures from the last Brazilian 
economic census - 1985 - show that supermarkets and hypermarkets 
distributed 78 % of the packed meat, 74 % of fresh fruits and vegetables, 
72% of grains and 71 % of dairy goods, among others.17 
iii) Government support for new food industries and foreign capital 
investment. 
In this period a complete change occurred in the sector's capital 
structure, which became increasingly oligopolistic. Roger Burbach and 
Patricia Flynn (1982), in their research on the entrance of US capital in 
the Latin American food industry, point to the establishment in Brazil 
of the following transnational companies in the post-war years: 
Anderson Clayton (oil refineries, 1948), Carnation (Leite Gloria, 
1960), Coca-Cola (instant coffee, 1957), CPC International (Dextrina, 
1963), Del Monte Corp. (canned fruits and vegetables, n.d.), General 
Foods Corp. (Kibon, 1957), Kellogg Co. (cereals, 1962), King Ranch 
Inc. (meats, 1954), Pepsi Co. (soft drinks, 1951), Quaker Oats (oats, 
1954), Standard Brands (starch, coffee and milk, 1957) and Warner 
Lambert (confectionery, 1962) among others. 
Moreover, new European investments in the period can be added to this 
list. Some traditional European companies opened branches or reinforced 
their investments in Brazil. Also, a new nucleus of Brazilian companies was 
formed in the food industry. The main segment of Brazilian capital 
investment was in flour mills, pasta, canned conserves, sauces and dairy 
products. 
The following three case studies in the Brazilian food industry are useful 
in comparing the origins and structure of capital from the first phase to the 
second phase. Some industrial enterprises in the early twentieth century had 
in their further development clear examples of all the above mentioned 
transformations. 
Slaughterhouses 
The early slaughterhouses were established in Brazil in the late nineteenth 
century. They were modest and aimed to supply the growing urban demand. 
The large slaughterhouses arose only in the 1910s in the states of Sao Paulo, 
Rio de Janeiro and Minas Gerais, not only to supply internal demand, but 
also to export to struggling countries in Europe. 
The advent of large firms in this sector had begun with the arrival in 1913 
of Wilson - one of the biggest groups in meat processing in the United States 
(see Suzigan, 1986, p. 335). In addition, the British Anglo company arrived 
in 1912; in 1917 the Brazilian Meat Company entered the industry and later 
the US companies Armour (1917) and Swift (1919) became involved. 
Enterprises belonging to the Matarazzo family and those of national groups 
also participated in this period. 
These companies, which survived for more than fifty years, rapidly 
declined in the 1960s. At this time they were being replaced by new national 
groups such as Bordon, Mouran, La Villete, Kaiowa and by others who came 
from poultry processing such as Sadia, Perdigao, Chapeco, Frangosul, Seara 
(Hering). In fact, almost all companies that initiated their activities in this 
industry in the early part of the century were sold or closed down, with their 
assets being incorporated into new groups.18 
The turning point in this sector might be observed at the beginning of the 
1960s, when most of the foreign companies were not flexible enough to 
adjust to the rapid market changes. The national groups, favoured by the 
increasingly strict sanitation regulations and enjoying state support and access 
to scarce sources of raw materials, became leaders in the industry. 
Sugarcane Industry 
The modern nucleus of the sugar agro-industry was established in the 1920s 
in Sao Paulo (Cano, 1977, p. 67; Szmerecsanyi, 1986, p. 29). Some activity 
in sugar production and refining already existed in the late nineteenth 
century, but the great impulse was given by the coffee crisis when millions 
of 'rubiaceae' trees were eradicated. The former 'sugar square' constituted 
by Sorocaba, Piracicaba, Jundiai and Mogi Guagu19 was enlarged, and the 
state of Sao Paulo abandoned its main role of refiner, having only a small 
share of supply,20 and became a large sugarcane producer. 
In the 1930s new sugarmills were erected in Sertaozinho, Cravinhos, 
Araraquara, Pontal and other towns of the interior of Sao Paulo. According 
to Ramos (1983) the four biggest sugar companies of this period, whose 
combined share was 64.2% of the national sugar product between 1930-31 
and 1935-36, were: Societe des Sucreries Brasiliennes (28.2%), Morganti 
(17.3%), Francisco Junqueira (9.8%) and Matarazzo (8.9%). From the late 
1940s onwards the Central-Southern region surpassed the traditional 
Northeast as a whole, and Sao Paulo was consolidated as the dynamic heart 
of the sugar agro-industry. 
At the same time as marriages and fusions among traditional sugar clans 
continued, a radical change occurred in the 4paulista'21 sugar framework 
over a thirty-year period. In the 1940s new groups were established;22 these 
were derived from industry - Biagi, Dedini Brothers and Zillo-Lorenzetti, for 
example; from the financial sector - such as Silva Gordo (Banco Portugues); 
and also from building works such as the Balbos.23 
Due to the sugar expansion in the 1970s and later, in 1975, the birth of the 
Pro-alcohol Program, a new wave of capital entered the industry, and from 
this period onwards the industry had a new capital structure. Some names 
from the 1940s and 1950s flourished, including Ometto, Dedini, Biagi and 
Zanini. Even though a few sugar businesses from early in the century 
remained - such as Matarazzo or Junqueira - their importance was reduced. 
Also the 'usineirosm from the Northeast, the powerful latifundio class that 
ruled local politics, lost importance, giving way to 4paulistas'. 
In the late 1970s a new dimension emerged in this sector. The most 
modern and powerful productive capital was found in two consortia: the 
COPERSUCAR - Central Cooperative of Sugar and Alcohol Producers - and 
the SOPRAL - Sugar and Alcohol Producers' Society. Their members were 
the new capitalist corporations, cooperatives, traditional groups and other 
businesses related to the sugarcane industry. 
From the 1980s onwards the largest sugarcane mills - in terms of 
sugarcane milling volume - were all part of this new generation.25 None 
among the big sugarmills and autonomous alcohol distilleries belonged to the 
old generation. COPERSUCAR, which comprises 70 sugarmills and five 
autonomous distilleries in the centre-south region, in 1990-91 reached a share 
of 27.9% of total Brazilian sugarcane output, 26.7% in sugar and 30.3% in 
alcohol. Moreover, the COPERSUCAR group also operates in coffee and 
other food products, making it the biggest Brazilian food company.26 
These changes experienced in the centre-south dynamic nucleus of the 
sugarcane agro-industry did not occur at the same pace in the northeast. 
There, a movement of centralisation leading to mergers took place in the 
inter-war period. Later, in the pro-alcohol phase, new groups and groups 
derived from traditional corporations turned to ethanol production on a 
modern basis, mainly in the state of Alagoas. Nevertheless, considering the 
capital structure of the groups involved in the process, no major change 
occurred in the northeast.27 
Flour-Milling Industry 
Capital that participates in the flour-milling industry in Brazil has its origins 
in the first industrialisation boom of the late nineteenth century. Grain and 
wheatflour importers, with warehouses located in the main ports, started to 
widen their activities by setting up flour mills. Although many mergers 
occurred at that time, the foreign and the traditional local companies 
remained. 
The case of flour mills might be presented as an exception to the generally 
rapidly changing food industry. Nonetheless, two important new elements 
contributed to making this case an exception: the ruin of the old colonial mills 
in the south and premature state intervention. 
State intervention establishing ceilings on price and quantity controls began 
in the 1920s. With this policy the government succeeded in removing from 
the market the small competitors, who were integrated in agricultural 
production. From that time the sector was increasingly concentrated in a few 
large mills (Muller, 1980). However, the colonial mills - established to 
process wheat for domestic and regional demand in the southern states of 
Brazil - survived until the late 1970s. 
Suzigan (1986) explains that four groups controlled almost all wheat flour 
production in Brazil in the 1920s: the British Rio Flour Mills, the Argentine 
Bunge & Born, and Matarazzo and Moinho Fluminense, both Brazilian. 
These four groups together had an internal system that allowed them to 
establish quotas while at the same time obstructing the entry of new 
competitors. Based on this system, these companies succeeded in expanding 
the milling capacity of the northeast using preferential imports of wheat from 
the United States. 
Later on, in the 1950s, due to the cheap wheat policy and the incentives 
given to consumers, the industry progressed rapidly. The quota system only 
benefited the established firms, those big companies approving the cartel's 
supply management. There was no room for the new investors, which led the 
entrepreneurs towards related areas in downstream activities. From the 1950s 
onwards many companies were installed in the pasta, biscuits, bread and 
other segments of the food industry without any possibility of backward 
integration due to the quota system. 
Trying to end the ongoing food crisis in the early 1960s, the military 
government imposed a state monopoly on wheat in 1967. The government 
bought up wheat - from Brazilian farmers and abroad - in order to sell it to 
mills. The wheat prices as well as the flour produced were officially 
controlled, with the government managing the prices and subsidies to 
indigenous farmers and mills in order to stabilise the supply. 
When this system ended in 1990, because of the government's commitment 
to reducing its expenses, the sector's production was one third of its 
processing capacity. As the flour mills were not allowed to increase their 
output over their quotas, and the prices were controlled, there was no 
competition among companies. In that sense the only way to discourage new 
entries was through increasing capacity. 
These distortions made the wheat-flour mills one of the most concentrated 
economic sectors in Brazil. Bunge & Born had 30% of the quotas in the late 
1980s. The profits came from the 5% sales margin guaranteed by 
government, and mostly from the differences between sales and purchasing 
terms. 
After deregulation, the flour mill industry began changing quickly. Many 
trading companies are now investing in this activity, replacing government 
in supplying wheat and seeking integration forward. As a consequence, prices 
are falling rapidly and traditional companies are near collapse. On the other 
hand, new sources of capital have entered this saturated sector as independent 
companies or as a result of backward integration. 
The Trajectory of the Food Industry in Brazil 
Although the cases of meat processors, sugar mills and the milling industry 
have been discussed, it is necessary to put all these examples in the food 
industry into context. Until now, two phases can be seen in the development 
of the food industry in Brazil. The observations on the performance of the 
Brazilian food industry contained in this section illustrate the emergence of 
a third phase in which industrial restructuring is the main subject. 
The two phases seen up to this point are as follows: 
The initial phase corresponds to the first industrialisation boom from the last 
quarter of the nineteenth century. In this phase the presence of flour mills, 
animal fats and oil factories, slaughterhouses and sugar refineries brought 
together a circle of small and medium-sized companies28 facing an 
increasingly urban population. 
Most of the capital goods used by the food industry were imported, and the 
economic dynamism came from abroad. The performance of coffee 
determined the industry's rate of expansion, due to its dependence on 
employment and urbanisation. 
The second phase, initiated in the post-war period, placed the food sector in 
a broader industrialisation context. In this phase, new capital - from both 
national and foreign sources - developed additional areas for investment and 
also rejuvenated the trajectory of the old food industry. 
A different market environment then arose with new consumer habits. The 
emergence of supermarkets and convenience foods radically transformed the 
suppliers developing the fordist paradigm all over the world. In Brazil, these 
effects started to be felt in the late 1950s. However, because of the 
characteristics of the Brazilian market, the fordist model of consumption and 
production did not take root. 
In the late 1970s, the Brazilian food industry entered its third phase. This 
new phase can be attributed to the emergence of new competitors and new 
sources of capital in the industry. As occurred in the former two phases, a 
new capital wave flooded the food sector, re-establishing links with other 
segments of the food system. Two events contributed to the development of 
this new phase. 
On the one hand, the beginning of industrial economic restructuring in the 
developed world (see Tavares, 1992) led to new forms of competition, as 
companies reviewed their overseas strategies. Also contributing to this new 
phase were rising economic protectionism, the 1980s recession in the 
developed world, and the emergence of trade blocs. 
On the other hand, the long economic recession, the collapse of state 
industrial intervention, and substantial changes occurring within and among 
firms all contributed to a new environment, displacing the state as a regulator 
of industrial development and opening new fields for investment. 
As a result of these two factors, foreign investment in the Brazilian food 
industry increased and represented the main field of interest for foreign 
capital in the period 1969-90.29 However, it is not only foreign capital that 
increased its investments in food industries; many Brazilian companies 
merged with competitors and entered new fields and new markets. The 
presence of Brazilian banks and other conglomerates in the production field, 
especially in agro-industry, is one striking feature of this. 
Table II lists the main partnerships or mergers in this third phase of the 
food industry in Brazil, using available data from the period 1985-91. This 
is only a small sample of the changes occurring in publicly quoted companies 
or companies for which public announcements were made. Table II does not 
include investments made by established firms in their own companies. 
The changes experienced by the Brazilian food industry in 1985-91, as 
shown in Table II, represent a radical change in most segments of industry. 
In addition to the listed acquisitions and mergers, many Brazilian and foreign 
groups entered new or stable product groups such as orange juice, vegetable 
oils, animal feed, dehydrated food, wines and beverages. 
Table II 
Brazil: Partnerships, Joint Ventures or Mergers in the Food Industry 
(1985-91) 
New Entries Origin Acquired Company Product Group 
Dart & Kraft USA Embare Confectionery 
Nestle SWI Ailiram1 e Buitoni Pasta 
Bunge & Born ARG Petybon Pasta 
Nabisco USA Jupiter Pasta 
Pepsi Co USA Elma Chips Pasta 
Borden USA Adria e Romanini Pasta 
Quaker Oats USA Toddy e Coqueiro Choc/Fish 
Philip Morris USA Kibon, Sorvane, 
Lacta2 e Q'Refresco3 
Ice Cream 
Choc/Beverages 
Hershey Foods USA Petybon4 e Lacta Pasta/Choc 
Fleishmann 
Royal USA 
Maguary5 Ice Cream/Juice 
Ferruzzi Spa ITA Cica Preserves 
M. Mars USA Neugebauer Chocolate 
Danone Gervais FRA Chandler e LPC Dairy/Choc 
New Entries Origin Acquired Company Product Group 
Parmalat ITA Teixeira, Supremo 
Via Lacta e Alimba6 
Dairy 
Bongrain 
(Polenghi) FRA 
Scandia, C.Limpo7 Dairy 
MD Foods DEN Vigor Dairy 
Gessy Lever GB/HOL Queijos Rex e Luna Dairy 
Sodima FRA Lacesa (Yoplait) Dairy 
Mansur (Leco) BRA Flor da Nata Dairy 
CPC (Ref. 
Milho Bras) USA 
McCormick e Kitano Sauces 
Sadia BRA Frig. Mouran Meat 
Perdigao BRA Chapeco8, Sulina e 
Borella 
Meat 
Hering (Ceval) BRA La Villete e Betinha Meat 
Bordon BRA Swift-Armour Meat 
Notes: 
1 Belonged to Beatrice Foods (USA) 
2 Lacta had been acquired by Suchard (FRA) and Philip Morris controlled 40% of 
the shares 
3 Philip Morris owned 45% of the shares 
4 Joint venture with Santista (Bunge & Born - ARG). The company also has a joint 
venture with LPC-Danone (FRA) 
5 Belonged to Souza Cruz (USA) 
6 Also Laticinios Alpha and S. Helena, less important acquisitions 
7 Also Laticfnios Aujuroca and Santa Rosa 
8 Perdigao owned 43% of shares 
The table lists partnerships of foreign companies followed by those of national 
companies. ARG: Argentina; BRA: Brazil; DEN: Denmark; USA: United States of 
America; FRA: France; GB: Great Britain; HOL: Holland; ITA: Italy; SWI: 
Switzerland. 
Source: Research in specialised press 
The Table suggests a new investment wave which, as has been pointed out 
before, represents a new trajectory similar to that occurring in the developed 
countries. Data from the Brazilian Central Bank confirm that in the last 
decade US$2.5 billion of foreign capital was invested in agro-industry, of 
which more than US$1 billion was destined for the food industry. 
In a world framework, these Brazilian movements coincide with a wider 
change in positions involving the main international food production and 
distribution companies. According to Perez and Oncuoglu (1990), these 
movements in the international food industry are called 'structural 
operations' due to their ability to change the sector's morphology. These 
movements are also related to a new form of competition. Huge mergers and 
transactions set this phase in an international framework.30 However, even 
more dramatic than changing assets is the substantial transformation of the 
competitive environment. 
In regard to capital positioning, there is no doubt that the Brazilian food 
industry is entering a new phase. Many aspects must be examined, however, 
to confirm this trend. As in the international framework, a restructuring 
process is based on more elements than a simple shift in the ownership of 
assets. These elements will be investigated in detail in the next sections of 
this paper, which constitute the central subject of the author's research. 
A New Paradigm in the Food Industry 
of Developed Countries 
Unlike many other goods, food maintains a constant and recurring 
relationship with consumers. Decisions on what and how to consume food are 
taken every moment. Product attributes such as quality and price are 
constantly evaluated by consumers. Also, the final food production is distinct 
from other types of production due to its basic regional characteristics. 
Massive exports of prepared food are not common in any developed or 
developing country and are considered to be 'market deformities'. 
During the post-war period, many factors contributed to the emergence of 
a pattern of so-called fordist consumption. Among these factors are the 
following: 
i) The food shortage in Europe and the aid and recovery programmes 
led by the USA.31 The great production effort in agriculture and 
industry permitted, in global terms, the transition from a food deficit 
and hunger to overproduction in fifteen years. 
ii) High price elasticity of food products. Given the economic 
depression in Europe and other regions, growth in demand was directly 
related to increases in household income and product price reduction. 
iii) The effective penetration of media and advertising and the 
homogenisation of habits and demand. This occurred with the 
introduction of television when mass communication became a reality. 
iv) Generalisation of oligopolistic behaviour in the food industry. The 
first oligopolies in the food sector were established (mostly in the 
United States) early in the 1920s. In the post-war period the presence 
of huge corporations intensified, in spite of the implementation of 
thorough anti-monopoly legislation in the USA and Europe. The United 
Kingdom, for instance, passed restrictive legislation that considered 
some activities, such as the food industry, to be in the 'public interest\ 
v) The gradual rise in the scale of production. The optimal scale of 
production increased because of the generalisation of consumption on 
the one hand and, on the other, the desire to impose barriers to entry by 
existing suppliers. 
vi) The low participation of larger units in the food distribution sector. 
Until the early 1950s, food retailing was based on small business, well 
dispersed and very specialised. At this time, retailing had not 
experienced the self-service revolution. 
All these factors set the conditions for the introduction of a new competitive, 
fordist, pattern within the international food industry. The fordist 
accumulation pattern aims for mass production and falling costs in order to 
supply uniform products for mass consumption. 
The participation of transnational companies in many segments of the food 
industry can be linked to their strategy to supply markets through mass 
production, low prices and margins in the post-war period. Enormous 
business structures were constructed to support the expansion of the 
international companies into new markets, offering homogeneous food 
products to compete with local companies, local tastes and local consumer 
habits. The predominance of transnational companies was established all over 
the world through their brands, prices and revolutionary way of marketing. 
Berhman (1984), analysing the competitive strategy of international food 
companies, describes them as 'market seekers' due to the constant need to 
widen their consumption and production bases. Investigating the food firms, 
Rama (1992a) underlines the fact that the competition in this field is from 
country to country, contributing to the multidomestic characteristic of the 
food industry. This is in contrast to most international industry, in which 
competition is global. 
Given this competitive pattern, the management of these companies is 
required to have widespread knowledge of the market. Issues such as brand 
fidelity and constant consumption are everyday concerns for international 
companies in each country. Advertising and cultural environment have been 
the most important weapons in the food supply competition. Nonetheless, 
without low prices the goal of mass consumption would never be reached. In 
this sense, the expansion of the food industry in the post-war period can only 
be explained by the constitution of a 'virtuous circle' of growth. 
In this period, flourishing consumption was provided for by the addition 
of new production units with huge advertising investments. Increasing 
agricultural output and the standardisation of raw materials, given the new 
crop techniques, allowed low costs and cheap prices to filter down to the 
consumer. And finally, continuous employment growth supplied the market 
with new waves of consumers eager to spend their earnings. All these 
elements converged to form a 'virtuous circle' of capital accumulation. 
The continuous enlargement of this circle allowed an enormous supply to 
be concentrated in the hands of a few companies which held a considerable 
market share. In the late 1980s, the ten largest firms in the world agro-food 
sector had a turnover of US$185 billion in production and trade activities 
(Rastoin and Allay a, 1990). As an additional basis of comparison, according 
to the International Labour Organisation the food industry was the largest 
industry in the world, with a turnover of US$800 billion in 1975 (ILO, 
1984). In spite of the different dates and sources, these figures show that the 
power of big companies is striking.32 
According to Williamson (1985), the oligopolistic predominance in 
particular activities cannot be explained by the traditional theory of barriers. 
On the contrary, the output concentration generally is linked to a successful 
strategy to reduce transaction costs. The main feature of this strategy is 
vertical integration. Vertical integration leads to more output concentration, 
which seldom translates into reduction of final prices. 
This is exactly the case of the food industry. The main objective of 
integration in this industry has always been to lower the costs of suppliers. 
Such integration should lead to falling prices. Nevertheless, what takes place 
is exactly the contrary: evidence shows that processed food prices are rising 
in spite of a drop in costs of agricultural raw materials.33 
Data from 1977 for the United States show that three-quarters of output in 
the food industry has come from structures considered to be oligopolies. 
Integration contracts are the most conventional structural form of production. 
In the United States, for instance, integration contracts are responsible for 
more than 90% of the supply in some segments such as poultry, milk, 
sugarbeet etc. (Marion, 1985). In Europe, the situation is the same. Many 
European companies are being prosecuted by government agencies under 
anti-trust legislation in areas such as sugar, tinned vegetables and baby-foods, 
among others (Maunder, 1983). 
Given the market saturation experienced from the early 1970s and the 
impossibility of further large productivity gains, the fordist strategy of 
accumulation reveals some problems. In short, the fordist production and 
consumption pattern has fallen into crisis. 
On the one hand, due to the particular shape of the demand curve and 
given household income, the demand for food is relatively inelastic. 
Consumers are spending proportionally less than ever on food. In the 
developed countries spending on food has not followed the population's rise 
in income. Also, with the world recession in the last few years, consumers 
have spent less and purchase only the essentials. In the United Kingdom, food 
spending in the home and outside the home fell from 29% of household 
income in the 1960s to 17.2% in the 1980s, and then to 12.7% in the early 
1990s (Burns, 1983; Goodman and Redclift, 1990; IMF, 1993).34 In Italy 
this proportion was 20% (Fanfani and Montresor, 1991) and in the USA only 
17% in the 1980s (Ritson et al, 1986). 
The food industry is representative of the well-known Engel's Law, given 
family size and dietary habits. As food consumption has shrunk as a 
proportion of income, industry's only alternative in order to increase profits 
on sales to the highest levels of household income is by adding value to their 
products. 
The food consumption crisis is the other side of the agricultural crisis 
(Goodman and Redclift, 1990). The agricultural growth that followed the 
post-war period was tuned to a fordist diet. Mass marketing, advertising and 
standard products were the characteristics of this phase. To quote Goodman 
and Redclift (1990, p. 20), 4It is at the level of food manufacturing and 
consumption, rather than agricultural production, that the analogy with 
"fordism" in this industry is most apposite....' Given the market saturation, 
the fordist diet entered a crisis requiring a gradual restructuring of industry 
and market strategies. 
Two of the main social elements that have provided the impulse to the new 
fordist pattern in the post-war period are presenting continuing problems: the 
expansion of female labour and the increasing variety and use of labour-
saving home appliances. First, the women going out to work opened the way 
for new, more practical and convenient food products. Secondly, the 
housewife began to rely on additional appliances, transferring the traditional 
hard work of preparing and cooking ingredients to the factory environment. 
With the proper appliances and convenience foods, tasks in the kitchen were 
reduced. 
Common sense suggests that the introduction of ready-to-cook food and 
new appliances freed women from housework giving them opportunities in 
the labour market. However, as Goodman and Redclift (1991) point out, the 
direction of this causality is exactly the opposite. Women were compelled to 
work outside the home and contribute to the family budget, and the food 
industry responded by providing the necessary support to facilitate housework 
tasks. The food industry had to begin offering more practical meals, and the 
retail sector had to exhibit new and more convenient formats of sale. Finally, 
a new, important segment arose in the food industry: the profitable catering 
service.35 
Nonetheless, from the mid-1970s these two expansionary elements of 
demand collapsed. Female participation in the labour market reached its 
ceiling of 50% in most developed countries. Also, the demand for new home 
appliances was reduced; most kitchens now have all the gadgets they can 
sustain. From this environment, the implementation of new strategies 
regarding the growth of production became much more intense. The main 
source of growth was not the horizontal widening of consumption, but its 
deepening through product differentiation. 
The outstanding growth of profit margins reached by companies illustrated 
this new phase of industry. In spite of the so-called 'consumer crisis', the 
profitability of the remaining industry post-concentration, as well as the added 
value provided, increased in the 1980s. According to Rama (1992a, p. 58), 
between the 1960s and the 1980s profits after taxes in the US food industry 
grew from 7% to 10% of sales.36 In the United States, for instance, the food 
sector is the leader among industry's nineteen sectors. This sector - including 
tobacco and beverages - in 1980 contributed 14% of the entire US value 
added (Connor et al, 1985). 
The food industry expands slowly in developed countries; its growth rate 
is less than the rate of population growth.37 Nevertheless, the competitive 
strategy of international food companies is adjusted to supply goods to this 
saturated market. Given their enormous population growth and also economic 
growth, one would expect developing countries to be the main investment 
field for transnational food companies. However, in general these companies 
prefer to invest in saturated markets in developed countries. An overview of 
investments on the part of the US food industry has shown that developing 
countries represented only around 23 % of investment destinations in the last 
decade; Europe had roughly two-thirds of total investment (Rama, 1992a). 
This new transnational positioning can no longer be considered typically 
fordist. The competition is not measured now by market size but by intensity 
of consumption, particularly in terms of increasing the value added of 
products. The First World consumer will always be motivated to consume 
since the products available fulfil the requirements of convenience, taste, 
appearance and quantity. The consumer will be eager to spend what is 
necessary in order to satisfy these requirements. 
The former fordist companies were forced to change to face a global 
demand, making large investments in marketing to overcome differentiations 
by social class and region. Such transformations have led to a new 
competitive pattern in the past two decades. This new environment has caused 
the mainstream theoretical framework to be re-examined. Indeed, the cost 
theoretical transaction model does not suit the new production conditions. 
Considering the agro-food system as a whole, the problem is not only to 
reduce transaction costs, but also to regain flexibility and quality. 
According to the original theory, transaction costs are a necessary part of 
shifts in the productive system. Transaction costs are different from other 
costs of production, which are the basis of neoclassical theory. Williamson 
(1985) stated that transaction costs are the equivalent of friction in physics. 
The absence of friction in any natural system is unrealistic. The same is 
true for an economic system. Transactions costs can explain why certain 
competitive structures were erected. In other words, transaction costs theory 
helps explain how economic agents behave in the search for reducing friction. 
Verticalisation is one of many strategies of cost reduction. Franchising, joint 
ventures and distribution agreements are further forms of the relationship 
between agents. However, all these related forms have the same 
characteristic: they are relatively stable and assume collaboration schemes 
between the agents. 
Changes in supply orientation are transforming mass production into a 
differentiated and segmented production. The collaboration between agents 
tends to be extended and more permanent. The relationship between firms is 
no longer guided by market mechanisms. Issues such as price, quality and 
delivery terms are discussed in parallel agreements. This might be said to be 
a new stage, given the collaboration between agents and having 'a new 
paradigm based on solidarity between actors who work together in the same 
production wisdom that flows from demand to supply' (Green and Rocha dos 
Santos, 1992a, p. 209). This new solidarity paradigm is called the network 
economy. 
Using the example of Toyota's integration model, Williamson (1985) 
underlines that this company and its suppliers worldwide have a common 
development project. Despite common interests, the contract renovation 
between Toyota and its suppliers is not automatic. The Japanese company 
uses its power to promote competition among its suppliers and this has a 
frictional cost. The network economy model allows for such arrangements, 
making it unlikely that friction will be totally eliminated between agents. 
As has been noted, another relevant difference between the network 
economy and the traditional model is that in the network the main concern is 
to improve the process as a whole. In improving the efficiency, the origin of 
the inputs - the company's own inputs or those of external suppliers - matters 
less than the optimisation of 4 the entire cost from different actors related to 
productive operation, and useless questioning of who is the capital's owner' 
(Green and Rocha dos Santos, 1992a, p. 208). 
The network economy paradigm holds a post-fordist rationale that touches 
directly on the performance of the agrofood system today. The changes in the 
agro-food system, due to consumer sophistication and low price elasticity, led 
to new forms of production without addressing the issues of cost reduction 
and scales of production. Nowadays, consumers' decisions are based on a 
thorough consideration of their needs. Consumers participate in a large 
number of food-related transactions every day. Enjoying high income and 
choice, consumers will spontaneously adopt a differentiated diet. In this 
context, the fordist diet loses out to alternatives like 'healthy foods', 'ethnic 
foods', and others. 
These changes on the demand side affect the entire food chain, making a 
flexible adjustment in the production process. This shift occurs mainly in the 
following operations: 
1. Food production procedures 
2. The capital-labour relationship 
3. Product circulation 
4. The inter-companies relationship. 
The effect of these changes in agriculture is widespread. In this sector the 
adjustment is prolonged and difficult, given that most innovation is outside 
agriculture. It has not yet been possible to customise agricultural products for 
commercial purposes. It is quite difficult producing animal or vegetable 
goods on a large scale for each market segment in a short period. Until now, 
agriculture has had marginal participation in the post-fordist dynamic. In 
general, product customisation takes place in the industrial environment by 
means of bleaching and adding flavourings, regulators and artificial 
preservatives. Although there are forms of product customisation in the 
agricultural field, most of these processes do considerable damage to the 
environment. 
Looking at industry as an organisational system, we can see that productive 
solidarity means new organisational forms. The links between firms and 
agents are not fortuitous; they are limited to buying and selling. With 
production flexibility, third-party schemes in all manufacturing phases have 
become the norm. Third-party schemes involve mutual agreements of 
collaboration with shared responsibilities. 
Given the increasing influence of demand on the manufacturing process 
and companies' marketing strategies, the distribution link becomes a critical 
element in the competition. Distribution means not only retail and wholesale, 
but also all services related to production such as marketing, advertising, 
customer service, etc. The importance of advertising in food, drink and 
tobacco sales cannot be underestimated. These producers are the biggest 
advertisers in Europe, the United States and Third World countries such as 
Brazil. Connor et al (1985) estimates that in the 1980s the US consumer paid 
10% more, on average, for companies' brand-name products just to cover the 
publicity cost. 
It is in distribution that companies could employ, with advantage, the gains 
provided by new competitive circumstances. Food retailing, for instance, is 
linked directly to the consumer. Retailing has excellent conditions in which 
to assess consumer preferences and so change supply conditions when 
necessary in order to be competitive. 
New information technology such as scanners and bar codes have given 
supermarkets the opportunity to evaluate their positions every day, using this 
information to take decisions. Nowadays, in developed countries, 
supermarkets can obtain sociodemographic profiles of their customers, 
enabling them to estimate their purchasing habits precisely. Decisions are 
then taken regarding suppliers, ticket prices, margins and promotions. Food 
retailing has recently reached a remarkable synergistic stage. On one side 
consumers provide more information on their preferences and, on the other, 
the retailer puts on sale exactly what the consumer wants. 
As a result of these supermarket advances, consumers increase their 
identification with point-of-sale and consequently with different retail brands. 
Supermarkets' possibilities of penetrating the market through their private 
branded products are growing quickly. In the United Kingdom, where this 
process is more advanced, retailers have managed to sell private brands to 
almost every consumer group.38 
Given the simple technology involved in the manufacture of major foods, 
beverages and even tobacco, the production of these items is spread among 
many companies. Innovations are rare: most frequently, traditional products 
are simply subjected to new forms of presentation. Nowadays, any firm in the 
food business is able to reproduce, to the same quality, the majority of 
products made. In reality, what distinguishes one product from another is 
only the brand name. Not surprisingly, huge amounts are spent by companies 
for advertising and sales promotion to fix their brands in the consumer's 
mind. As Rama (1992b) demonstrates, the profits appropriation period is 
very short in the food industry. Most profits can be obtained immediately 
after the launch of a new product or a modified old product. Because of this 
peculiarity, the profit margins are high and remain high until new companies 
penetrate the market. 
In this respect, food distributors have an advantage. Through integration 
schemes with producers, large supermarket chains can sell their own brands 
that are of the same quality as top brandname products, but at cheaper prices. 
Retailers are linked to their industry suppliers and are able to replenish empty 
shelves within a few hours. 
Statistics show a close relationship between supermarket concentration and 
the distribution of private brands. In most high- and medium-income 
countries, the ten largest supermarket chains control at least 50% of grocery 
sales. In these countries the own-brand process has progressed rapidly. 
This link between supermarket concentration and private brands, however, 
may not be valid for all countries. In Brazil, for instance, there is very high 
supermarket concentration - in the late 1980s, the ten largest supermarket 
chains held 79 % of sales - yet a private brands strategy is almost non-existent 
(Rama, 1992a; Marion, 1985 and Green, 1992b). On the one hand, this fact 
demonstrates that the power of industrial supplier companies is still very 
strong in countries like Brazil. On the other hand, it shows that both 
supermarkets and small- to medium-sized producers have not achieved any 
sort of integration in terms of supply.39 
Given the large amount of inexpensive goods traded in supermarkets within 
a short time, the managing of logistic systems are critical. In France, 
investment in business information for retailing activities reached US$4 
billion in 1991.40 That is why a new profitable business is emerging in 
developed countries: logistic services. According to Green (1992b, p. 53) 
this is one of the fastest growing businesses in France. In 1986, for instance, 
31 % of added value - 15.5% of final consumer prices - in the French food 
industry was held by logistic activities. According to these figures, in areas 
such as frozen foods the logistic costs can reach 40% of retail sales turnover. 
All these elements combine to show that, in the early 1980s, the agro-food 
system entered into a new phase penetrated by post-fordist techniques. The 
next section investigates the impact of these changes on Brazil. 
Brazil: Crisis and Restructuring 
In the last decade Brazil has experienced an intense process of mergers and 
acquisitions in its food industry. Does this activity mean that Brazil's food 
industry is undergoing a wide restructuring, or are the examples - as shown 
in Table II - merely sporadic cases dictated by transitory financial 
conditions? 
For a long time Brazil has been seen as a land of opportunities. 
Particularly in the case of the food industry, Brazil has been considered a 
promising investment field due to its alleged comparative advantage. An 
emerging consumer market, vast sources of raw materials, and cheap labour 
contributed to this view. Nevertheless, after all the changes in the fordist 
paradigm regarding production and consumption, what are the future 
prospects for Brazil? 
In terms of Brazil's market advantages, consider the following points: 
i) In the last ten years, Brazil has stagnated in terms of growth. Per capita 
income has declined and poverty has increased. Even in this depressed 
context, however, the food industry grew at a rate slightly higher than 
population growth and consequently higher than the GNP per capita growth. 
The population grew 2.48% per year in the 1970s dropping to 1.96% per 
year in the 1980s. Table III compares income growth with the performance 
of food and beverage sectors in Brazil in recent years. 
One may observe that the growth of the food and beverages industries has 
surpassed the growth of GNP overall. The increase of these sectors in 1980-
91 were 27.3% and 30.5%, respectively, compared to 25.1% for GNP and 
23.8% for population. Moreover, particularly in the case of the food 
industry, performance is conducted in a counter-cyclical way with a one year 
lag. When the economy declines, the food sector decreases less than the 
whole economy. Alternatively, when the economy goes up this sector also 
increases relatively less. The common explanation for this phenomenon is the 
relative non-compressibility of food demand. Even with decreasing income, 
people have to feed themselves. 
Official statistics collected in the last national research study of households 
show that, in spite of high income concentration and social differences, the 
Brazilian market has impressive dimensions. Families earning yearly more 
than ten minimum salaries - approximately US$9,600 per year - represent 
only 18.2% of Brazilian households, yet these families hold almost 60% of 
the disposable national income, nearly US$180 billion. Given that, in this 
income segment, families spend 25% of their income on food, both at home 
and outside the home, even considering only the richest strata a market of 
US$45 billion is created. 
Table III 
Brazil: GNP, GNP per capita and Food and Beverages Output Growth 
(1980-92) 
GNP 
GNP 
per capita Food Beverages 
1980 9.2 6.8 8.0 7.0 
1981 -4.5 -6.3 2.7 -7.4 
1982 0.5 -1.4 0.9 0.9 
1983 -3.5 -5.3 3.3 -5.0 
1984 5.3 3.3 -0.7 -0.6 
1985 7.9 5.9 0.2 11.0 
1986 7.6 5.6 0.3 23.2 
1987 3.6 1.6 4.9 -3.4 
1988 -0.1 -2.1 -2.4 2.4 
1989 3.3 1.2 1.3 14.7 
1990 -3.9 -5.9 2.3 -1.3 
1991 0.8 -1.1 4.9 1.5 
1992 -0.1 -3.0 n.a. n.a. 
Sources: FIBGE and Banco Central do Brasil - Boletim Mensal (various editions) 
The highest income strata in Brazil dwell in urban areas, chiefly in the 
centre-south. This region holds 59.3% of the Brazilian household income. 
Here, one can see that the Brazilian market is concentrated in two ways: 
among families and among regions. For the food industry this is a 
satisfactory operational framework. In this environment, more value added 
products can be distributed to demand in a concentrated area. Moreover, 
given the consumer's urban and cosmopolitan profile, the openings created 
by new shopping and consumer habits are much more advantageous. 
ii) Access to sources of raw materials has been widened by the food industry 
in two ways: first, by the opening and widening of international agricultural 
trade, and secondly, by the inclusion of substitutes and alternatives to 
primary raw materials. 
Regarding agricultural trade, this is so far a sluggish trend. Most 
agricultural trade is performed inside commercial blocs. Europe is self-
sufficient in most agricultural products. The United States has not only 
reached self-sufficiency, but also consolidated its position as the largest 
agricultural exporter in the world in the last decade. The only member of the 
OECD (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development) that 
remains heavily dependent on agricultural imports is Japan, where the food 
self-sufficiency is very low at nearly 40% (ABAG 1993, p. 43).41 For this 
reason, Japanese investment abroad in the food industry is high and has been 
concentrated basically in developing countries (Rama, 1992a). 
Curiously, the most visible trend in this area, is the recent entry of 
traditional traders into food production in developed countries. Because of 
the low profits obtained in international trade, many international companies 
are opening processing plants in Europe and Asian countries. Contrary to 
common sense, there is no defining trend within transnational investments. 
On the one hand, investment flows towards new fields, looking for 
diversification in developing countries; on the other hand, there is also some 
investment in complementary areas of food production. 
In the case of food products, it appears that since colonial times few things 
have changed. Developing countries are of interest only in terms of exporting 
irreplaceable tropical products. This is the main purpose for establishing 
factories near the sources of raw materials. However, because of 
protectionism by the wealthy - illustrated by quotas and preferential imports 
for former colonies - market expansion for these products is difficult and 
uncertain. 
In global terms, proximity to sources of raw materials is not necessarily 
a competitive advantage in terms of investment. This concept was related to 
geopolitical issues in the post-war environment, a period when shortages of 
food and raw materials were seen as a constraint on companies' growth. 
Regarding innovations within the agro-food system, however, the 
introduction of substitutes to natural products is only embryonic. Very few 
products or ingredients produced in a laboratory enter the market. Despite 
progresses in biotechnology and genetic engineering, it is too soon to 
announce a new agricultural or agroindustrial revolution based on these 
techniques. In fact, in schumpeterian terms, no change in the technological 
paradigm suggests new products or processes, or even cost reductions, in 
goods or services for the next decade (see Brown and Goldin, 1992). 
There is an exaggerated optimism about the new technologies which 
suggests that they can create new products to substitute imports. Such 
products, if produced at competitive costs, could invalidate any natural 
advantages in the production of raw materials. In other words, natural 
products could be reproduced at convenience according to different market 
needs. In this scenario, countries like Brazil would lose their place in raw 
materials production and in food supply to developed countries. Any 
discussion of biotechnology's future is misplaced here, however. It is enough 
to point out that the gains provided by new biotechnology have not shifted the 
original production framework. 
It is important to distinguish between the traditional biotechnologies such 
as brewing and enzymatic processes and new biotechnologies based on 
genetic manipulation, tissue breeding and others. Brewing and enzymatic 
digestion have long been established in the food industry. New biotechnology 
processes, however, have added only a few products, contributing little to 
food producers' expertise. Nevertheless, the food industry is one of the 
sectors in which the new technologies are developing faster.42 
The radical change that is likely to take place is related to animal and 
vegetable genetics. New genetically engineered plants such as potato, cotton, 
tomato, tobacco and soya have already been tested in laboratories and might 
be introduced to the market very soon, given their better resistance to insects, 
viruses and even weeds. In the animal sector, efforts to obtain more disease-
resistant cattle specimens could be a reality in the short run, as could the 
introduction of the first genetically manipulated fish. Nevertheless, there is 
a great uncertainty related to market acceptance of these products; consumer 
reaction is likely to be negative. Also, the question of intellectual rights on 
these new products is still controversial (OECD, 1992; Goodman and 
Redclift, 1991; Wilkinson, 1992). 
iii) The cost of Brazilian labour is an important positive factor in terms of 
comparative advantage. Despite the low quality of the labour force, reduced 
wages and the absence of industrial action have long been a key element in 
attracting long term foreign investment capital.43 
Contrary to common sense, the food, beverage and tobacco industries 
could be classified among those which have the highest capital intensity. 
According to Rama, in the United States labour represents only 12% of total 
industrial costs, half the industrial sector average (1992b, p. 38). Nowadays, 
most of the processes used by the food industry require little manual work. 
Given the sophistication of industrial procedures and the spillover of 
corporate strategies searching for superior market niches, factors such as 
low-cost labour have lost their former importance. In this new competitive 
phase, mass production with low costs in a fordist strategy gives way to 
quality and flexibility. In this new paradigm for the food industry, Brazil is 
in the early stage of transformation. 
Low wages keep out of the market an important part of the Brazilian 
population. This is another important labour-related aspect that does not fit 
even within the former fordist pattern. Mass consumption in Brazil is still 
restricted to parts of the population. Brazil is one of the biggest producers of 
soya beans, poultry and canned beef. Nevertheless, 'low wages and 
regressive income distribution weaken the articulation between the production 
complex of animal grains and mass consumption' (Goodman and Redclift, 
1991, p. 164). More than 75% of soya beans are exported, causing 
integration to a fordist consumption pattern in other countries with little 
internal integration. In this sense Goodman and Redclift (1991) regard Brazil, 
as well as Mexico, as a 'proto-fordist' agro-food system. 
Since the constitution of a common market, European countries have been 
doing their best to balance the power of purchase of their food consumers. 
Green and Rocha dos Santos (1992b) remarked that in Latin America, as a 
market, the opposite occurred. There are no regulations common to all 
countries, and transnational companies are not able to operate easily in such 
a heterogeneous market. Add to this the differences in legislation and 
consumption patterns as well as infrastructural deficiencies and political 
instability and it becomes clear why international companies prefer to act in 
other markets. 
Conclusions 
The aim of this paper has been to discuss the main aspects of the 
restructuring of the worldwide food industry and its effects on Brazil. The 
food industry was one of the first industrial activities to be constituted in 
Brazil in the last century. Its development until the 1930s was noteworthy for 
the import substitution process geared to the increasingly urban population. 
The origin of this first development phase has been identified with the links 
between the hegemonic agrarian and mercantile capital. At this time, most of 
the equipment and machinery involved in manufacturing were imported, and 
so linkages within the sectors of industry were weak. 
From the 1920s, the food industry grew and became an important target 
of foreign investment. Brazil's natural advantages and its huge emerging 
market have attracted an entire cluster of light industries. In the 1950s, with 
the establishment of industries in capital and intermediate goods, and with 
agricultural modernisation, modern food production began in Brazil. 
Contributing to this progress was the spread of a consumption pattern 
similar to that in developed countries, with the so-called fordist diet as 
support. Among many elements of this second phase of Brazil's food industry 
were mass production, the growing number of women engaged in the labour 
market, the introduction of home appliances and new consumer habits. 
Despite the large numbers of urban consumers incorporated into the 
market, the fordist strategy has not taken hold in Brazil. Unlike in other 
countries in which non-durable production was the basis of subsequent 
industrialisation, in Brazil this process remained inconclusive. The official 
policy depressing salaries and the uneven income distribution obstructed the 
permanent expansion of the market. At the same time, a spurious 
competitiveness was established emphasised by the high levels of external 
protection. 
From the 1950s industrial policy had shifted towards production of durable 
goods, leaving non-durables as a non-priority investment area. Economic 
plans at that time touched only marginally on non-durable goods as a 
particular target for government incentives. Without taking firm root, food 
production continued to expand, in absolute terms, towards medium- and 
upper-class consumers or, alternatively, towards foreign markets. 
The mid-1980s saw many changes in ownership positions in the food 
industry. New sources of capital emerged, mergers took place and new forms 
of relationship between companies and their market developed in Brazil. 
Given the restructuring process in the food industry, in this activity is Brazil 
only reflecting changes in developing countries or do they represent an initial 
step for a new industrial phase? 
Such activity in developed countries is very different in terms of quality 
from that which took place in Brazil in recent decades. The food industry in 
developed countries is gradually abandoning the fordist consumer pattern to 
adapt to a new reality. The dynamic element that drives this new phase is on 
the demand side, mostly in the food distribution link. 
The market power of the big food retailing chains is being used in Europe 
and the USA to shape and reinforce new consumer habits. Facing a saturated 
and non-permeable market, retailers and industry have succeeded in 
segmenting consumer preferences. Recent profit margins for industry and 
retailers are very impressive. Having failed to widen the consumer base with 
price reductions, companies instead tried to deepen the consumer base. To 
this end, remarkable innovations - technical and organisational - have been 
made to establish a so-called network economy. 
The Brazilian market is affected in negative and positive ways by 
restructuring of the worldwide food industry. There are significant temporal 
factors such as economic instability and low external opening that hamper the 
attraction of new foreign capital to Brazil's food sector. Nevertheless, the 
same transitory circumstances seem to have encouraged the acquisition of 
new assets in Brazil. Low acquisition prices and an economically depressed 
framework are attracting many investors to the food sector. In addition, 
Brazil's relaxed fiscal, environmental and health legislation are favourable 
factors for new entries into this sector. 
Nowadays, new foreign investors and new national companies entering the 
field are benefiting from joint venture schemes or cooperation agreements in 
the food sector. These are still only a small part of the observed search for 
greater efficiency in production and distribution. Brazil is a long way from 
reaching a new post-fordist production paradigm. Given the observed trends, 
however, it is clearly heading in that direction. 
Notes 
1. These activities were established on a new basis and could not be considered 
enlargements of the so-called Rural Complex. 
2. See, for example, Cano (1977), Cardoso de Mello (1975), Dean (1969), 
Suzigan (1986) and Silva (1976) among others. Note that this subject is quite 
polemical and has been the subject of a long debate in the Brazilian economic 
literature. 
3. 'Os proprios fazendeiros investiam seus lucros em industrias diretamente e 
indiretamente quando seus lucros transitavam pelo sistema bancario (ou eram 
investidos na propria constituigao dos bancos) ou por outra forma qualquer de 
in termedia l financeira e de capital' (Cano, 1977, p. 129). 
4. Paim quotes Rangel due to his importance as an exponent of the Rural 
Complex concept in the agrarian Brazilian literature based on Lenin {The 
development of Capitalism in Russia). In his classic book A Questao Agraria 
Brasileira (Recife: CDEP, 1962), published only years after Gilberto Paim's 
Industrializacao e Economia Natural, Rangel applies this concept to a specific 
situation showing the self-containment of the Brazilian rural economy: 
'The peasants, in spite of their ordinary ignorance (sic), are continuously 
comparing their work in the rural activity, secondary and tertiary activities 
with other activities placed outside the Rural Complex' (1962, p. 32). 
5. In order to demonstrate the lack of monetary relationships in the whole 
Brazilian economy at that time, Paim notes that the first cloth factory was 
established in Sao Paulo only in 1873. Before this many urban factories had 
been forced to close down as there were insufficient consumers to sell to. Even 
the few factories that survived in that period had a difficult time competing with 
imports. 
6. '(•••) passava a ser melhor negocio para o fazendeiro desviar escravos das 
inumeraveis oficinas existentes na grande propriedade para as atividades da 
lavoura, habituando-se paulatinamente a comprar na cidade, a prego mais baixo, 
os produtos que antes saiam destas oficinas' (Paim, 1957, p. 46). 
7. In addition to cotton mills, sugar mills and sugar refineries, foundries, gun 
powder factories, breweries and other industrial activities were integrated to the 
Rural Complex. 
8. In those periods the government appealed to a devaluation policy seeking 
stability in coffee income. Under this policy, all imported goods became 
expensive with the exception of capital goods, which had received incentives 
(see Furtado, 1977, p. 197). 
9. Until 1930 foreign capital was concentrated in the public services. The only 
foreign investment of any note in agro-industry occurred in the second half of 
the 1920s, in the slaughter and cottonseed oil industries. For more on this issue, 
see Prado Jr. (1970), especially chapter 25. 
10. Burbach and Flynn (1982) identify in this period the great industrialisation 
boom in Latin America that involved huge transfers of capital from 
transnational companies. In the case of the food industry, the authors mention 
that one of the causes of this inflow towards industry was the weak performance 
of agricultural commodities in the international market. 
11. The Argentine example is remarkable. The food industry in Argentina was 
established in the last decades of the nineteenth century. The enlargement of this 
process was achieved by incorporating gradually new activities that emphasised 
so-called 'desarrollo hacia dentro'. One can see clearly in the figures how 
national production substituted step-by-step for imports (see Gatto and Gutman, 
1990). 
12. '(No Brasil) era praticamente impossivel que o processo de industrializagao 
se desse da base para o vertice da piramide produtiva, isto e, partindo-se dos 
bens de consumo menos elaborados e progredindo lentamente ate atingir os bens 
de capital' (Tavares, 1977, p. 46). 
13. In the automobile industry, the arrival of European companies such as 
Mercedes-Benz, DKW, Volkswagen, Renault, Scania and others supplanted US 
investment. However, in the food sector the US companies already had a vast 
experience in canned foods with distribution schemes that gave them an 
advantage over European companies. Moreover, in the post-war period the food 
industry in Europe was not doing well. 
Figures presented by Baer (1985) for the beginning of the 1950s prove the 
supremacy of US capital in Brazil. US investments were 43.9% of the total 
followed by Canada (30.3%), United Kingdom (12.1%), France (3.3%), 
Uruguay (3.1%), Panama (2.3%) and others (5.0%). For the late 1960s, when 
the Central Bank began to put together regular statistics on foreign investments 
in Brazil, the percentages were the following: USA (47.7%), Switzerland 
(13.9%), Germany (10.4%), Canada (9.8%), United Kingdom (6.4%), Japan 
(3.2%), France (2.0%) and others (6.6%). 
14. Only the first processing from agricultural raw materials is considered here. 
Also, it should be noted that these different economic censuses are not totally 
compatible. 
15. Souza Cruz now belongs to B. A. T. Industries. 
16. Superhiper magazine, October 1989, p. 47. 
17. The importance of the new links between retailers and food industry must 
be stressed. This relationship goes beyond buying and selling operations. The 
emergence of supermarkets as a new distribution form has meant a radical 
change not only in infra-structure but also in (the sector) relationship with other 
economic sectors. This altered the interdepartmental relationship opening new 
alternatives to capital circulation, industrial as well commercial' (Fundagao 
Getulio Vargas, 1980, p. 78). 
18. A good summary of the changes occurring in this sector can be found in 
Muller (1980). The author remarks that in the mid-1970s, when Brazil 
experienced a meat export boom, ironically the three big foreign firms (Swift, 
Armour and Wilson) were selling off part or all of their assets. 
19. For more on the sugar economy of Sao Paulo in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, see the excellent work of Petrone (1968). 
20. Estimated to be 20%, according to Cano (1977, p. 67). 
21. Residents of Sao Paulo State. 
22. See Belik (1992, p. 45). 
23. Many of these new 4usineiros' were immigrants who began in Brazil as 
employees in coffee and sugarcane farms and then progressed to owning farms. 
This seems to be the case with the Ometto family: Pedro Ometto, the head
the family, began as a supervisor in the Morganti farms and built a sugar 
empire. The same happened with the Dedini family: Mario Dedini, the Dedini 
head of the family was not properly an industrialist but a manager in the 
Morganti workshops. Nevertheless, many sugar families, from early on, had 
interests in industry, chiefly textiles, where they participated as small 
shareholders (Ramos, 1983, p. 85). 
24. Usineiros means sugarmill owners, but when applied to large plantation 
owners it is considered an offensive term. 
25. This included, for example, Da Barra, Sao Martinho, Sao Joao (Araras), 
Bonfim, Santa Elisa and Santa Adelia - all in Sao Paulo State. 
26. The company - not a cooperative as it is supposed to be - has a turnover 
of more than US$2 billion, reaching first place in the Brazilian food industry 
according to the magazine Exame - Maiores e Melhores. The figures were 
obtained from the 1991 accounts. 
27. For an overall description of sugarcane in the northeast, see Pinassi (1987) 
and Lima (1987). 
28. See Cano (1977, p. 221) for interesting remarks on the size of industrial 
establishments. Food industry companies were quite small, in terms of assets, 
compared to other industries such as textiles, glass, paper, matches and rope. 
29. Figures from Banco Central do Brasil - Boletim Mensal. 
30. The biggest mergers identified in the late 1980s were the following: RJR 
Nabisco (USA) incorporated by KKR (USA) in 1989 - US$24.7 billion; Kraft 
(USA) incorporated by Philip Morris (USA) in 1989 - US$13.lbillion; 
Pillsbury (USA) by Grand Met (UK) in 1988 - US$5.7 billion; Montedison 
(ITA) by Ferruzzi (ITA) in 1988 - n.a.; Buitoni (ITA) by Nestle (SWI) in 1988 
- FF 7.0 billion; Rowntree (UK) by Nestle (SWI) - US$4.3 billion; Martell 
(FRA) by Seagram (CAN) in 1988 - FF5.2 billion, Heublein (USA) by Grand 
Met (UK) in 1987 - US$1.2 billion; Courage (UK) by Elders IXL 
(AUSTRALIA) in 1986 - £1.4 billion; Beatrice Foods (USA) by KKR (USA) 
in 1986 - US$6.2 billion; Cheeseburgh Pond (USA) by Unilever (NL) in 1986 
- US$3.1 billion, Distillers (UK) by Guinness (UK) in 1986 - £2.5 billion; 
Nabisco (USA) by R. J. Reynolds (USA) in 1985 - US$4.9 billion; General 
Foods (USA) by Philip Morris (USA) in 1985 - US$5.7 billion; Carnation 
(USA) by Nestle (SWI) in 1984 - US$2.9 billion; Esmark (USA) by Beatrice 
Foods (USA) in 1984 - US$2.8 billion; Carlton (AUSTRALIA) by Elders IXL 
(AUSTRALIA) in 1983 - AUS$1 billion. 
For a complete list of mergers and acquisitions in the last decade see Perez and 
Oncuoglu (1990), Rama (1992a) and Green (1993). 
31. According to Goodman and Redclift (1991, p. 139) the United States, under 
the Public Law 480, exported US$22.3 billion in products between 1954 and 
1973. This amount represented 20% of the total agriculture exports in this 
period. Under PL 480 exports included not only cereals but also cotton, 
soybeans and dairy products. 
32. In food trade activity alone, the concentration is substantial. Goodman and 
Redclift (1991, p. 166), quoting many authors, mention that between 60% and 
90% of agricultural international trade is controlled by only fifteen transnational 
companies. Taking statistics for each commodity, one can see that between 
three and six companies have the largest share of the market. 
33. Connor et al (1985, p. 5) pointed to the fact that, before World War II, 
agricultural prices and those of processed food goods were aligned. However, 
between 1947 and 1972, agricultural prices in the USA dropped 15% at the 
same time as food prices rose 47%. 
34. Including expenditure on tobacco and drinks, this proportion goes up to 
22% of household income in Britain. 
35. According to Dossier, 'Le restauration collective en Europe' published by 
Restauration magazine (no. 267, 7 May 1993), the catering services in Europe 
served 2.4 billion meals in 1992. 
36. The performance of the world's largest agribusinesses in 1980-85 shows a 
sales growth rate between 5.17% and 13.54%. The growth in the net profits 
was outstanding reaching 30.45% in sugar and 25.62% in meat although sectors 
such as oils and fats have suffered heavy losses (-6.92%) [see Rama (1992a)]. 
37. According to Zuniga and Gutierrez (1992), the sales growth in developed 
countries did not exceed 0.5% p.a. in recent years. Also, reports of A.C. 
Nielsen, the international research company, show that Latin America has been 
the fastest-growing region in terms of food consumption. Among 27 researched 
countries - 3,000 product categories - analysed between 1987 and 1989, Latin 
America presented an increase of 15.4% in dairy sales for two years, compared 
to 3.4% in Europe, 2.1% in North America and 4.0% in the Pacific Rim. For 
sweets and confectionery the rates were 7.4%, 4.4%, 0.8% and 2.6%. 
38. Supermarkets in the United Kingdom lead in private brand sales. On 
average, UK supermarkets control 30% of groceries sales with private brands. 
The presence of private brands in other European supermarkets is around 20%. 
This British leadership can be explained in terms of sales concentration figures. 
In Britain the top five retailers have more than 60% of grocery sales, making 
it one of the most concentrated markets in the world. It is not, however, 
possible to establish a positive correlation between market concentration and 
private brand penetration (data obtained from the Financial Times, 15 June 
1993). 
39. US supermarkets are an interesting case. There, the concentration is not as 
high as in Europe. The ten largest supermarkets have less than 40% of sales, 
and the penetration of private brands reached only 9% of total sales recently 
(see Financial Times 15 June 1993 and Marion, 1985). 
40. According to Green (1993) approximately half of bar-coded prepared points-
of-sale in France did not exist three years ago. 
41. According to statistics of UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development) the participation of primary imports, including fuel, in total 
imports was 30.3% in Japan in 1990. The average for the developed countries 
was 16.1% in the same year. 
42. We may speculate that between now and 2000 A.D. the most substantial 
advances will happen in traditional and conventional areas as new bacteria are 
developed to enhance flavour and texture, enzymes, biocatalysis, biotests etc. 
(OECD, 1992). 
43. In spite of the low wages, labour costs in Brazil are not so modest. Low 
labour productivity and multiple duties make the cost of production very high. 
Pension and union contributions increase this cost to more than 100% of 
salaries. 
Bibliography 
ABAG (1993) Seguranga Alimentar: Uma Abordagem de Agribusiness. Sao 
Paulo: ABAG - Associagao Brasileira de Agribusiness. 
BAER, Werner (1985) A industrializacao e o desenvolvimento economico do 
Brasil. Rio de Janeiro: Ed. Fundacao Getulio Vargas. 
BELIK, W. (1992) Agroindustria Processadora e Politico. Economica. 
Unpublished PhD dissertation, Universidade de Campinas, SP. 
BROWN, M. andGOLDIN, I. (1992) The Future of Agriculture developing 
Country Implications. Paris: OECD. 
BURBACH, R. and FLYNN, P. (1982) Agroindustria nas Americas. Rio de 
Janeiro: Zahar. 
BURNS, J. (1983) 4A Synoptic View of Food Industry', in BURNS, J., 
McINERNEY, J. and SWINBANK, A. (eds.), The Food Industry -
Economics and Politics. London: Heinemann. 
CANDAL, A. (1969) Industrializagao Brasileira: Diagnostico e 
Perspectivas. Brasilia: Ministerio do Planejamento e Coordenagao Geral. 
CANO, W. (1977) Raizes da Concentragao Industrial no Brasil. Sao Paulo: 
T.A. Queiroz. 
CARDOSO de MELLO, J. M. (1975) O Capitalismo Tardio: Contribuigao 
a Revisao Critica da Formagao e Desenvolvimento da Economia Brasileira. 
Unpublished PhD disssertation, Universidade de Campinas, SP. 
CONNOR, J. M. et al. (1985) The Food Manufacturing Industries -
Structure, Strategies, Performance and Policies. Lexington. Mass.: 
Lexington Books. 
DEAN, W. (1969) The Industrialization of Sao Paulo: 1880-1945. Austin: 
University of Texas Press. 
FANFANI, R. and MONTRESOR, E. (1991) 'Filiere, Multinazionali e 
Dimensione Spaziale nel Sistema Agro-Alimentare Italiano', La Questione 
Agraria. no. 41. Milan. 
FIBGE (Fundagao Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatistica) (1990) 
Censo Industrial do Brasil 1985, No. 1. Rio de Janeiro: FIBGE. 
FUND AC AO GETULIO VARGAS (1980) Investimento Externo e Tendencia 
Oligopolista no Comercio Interno Brasileiro - Um Diagnostico Preliminar. 
Sao Paulo: Unpublished internal report. 
FURTADO, C. (1977) Formagao Economica do Brasil. Sao Paulo: Cia. 
Editora Nacional (15th edition). 
GATTO, F. and GUTMAN, G. E. (1990) 4El Sector Agroalimentario 
Argentino\ in GUTMAN, G. E. and GATTO, F. (eds.), Agroindustrias en 
la Argentina, Buenos Aires: Cepal, pp. 17-43. 
GOODMAN, D. and REDCLIFT, M. (1990)4The Farm Crisis and the Food 
System: Some Reflections on the New Agenda', in MARSDEN, T. and 
LITTLE, J. (eds.), Political, Social and Economic Perspectives on the 
International Food System. Aldershot: Gower, pp. 19-35. 
GOODMAN, D. and REDCLIFT, M. (1991) Refashioning Nature: Food, 
Ecology and Culture. London: Routledge. 
GREEN, Raul H. (1992a) 'Estrategias e Cambios Organizativos de los 
Grupos Alimentarios frente al Mercado Unico Europeo', in: RODRIGUEZ 
ZUNIGA, Manuel (ed.) (1992) El Sistema Agroalimentario ante el Mercado 
Unico Europeo. Madrid: Ministerio de Agricultura, Pesca y Alimentation, 
Editorial NEREA, pp. 35-58. 
GREEN, Raul H. (1992b) 'A Rigor di Logistica', Agricoop - Mensile della 
cooperazione agrialimentare. Bologna, Nov/Dec 1992, no. 10, pp. 26-30. 
GREEN, Raul H. (1993) Principales Tendencias de la Restructuracion del 
Sistema Alimentario Mundial. Paris: INRA. 
GREEN, Raul H. and ROCHA dos SANTOS, Roseli (1992a) 'Economia de 
Red y Reestructuracion del Sector Agroalimentario', Desarrollo Economico, 
Vol. 32, no. 126 (Jul/Sep), pp. 199-225. 
GREEN, Raul H. and ROCHA dos SANTOS, Roseli (1992b) Las 
Multinacionales Alimentarias y la Evolucion del Sistema Agroalimentario 
Mundial. Paris: INRA. 
ILO/UN (1984) The Social Effects of Technological Developments in the 
Food and Drink Industries, Including those Arising from New Production 
Methods and The Need of Training and Retraining. Food and Drink Industries 
Committe. Geneva: ILO/UN. 
IMF (INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND) (1993), International 
Financial Statistics Yearbook. Washington DC: IMF. 
KAGEYAMA, A. et al. (1990) 'O Novo Padrao Agricola Brasileiro: Do 
Complexo Rural aos Complexos Agroindustrials', in DELGADO, G. C. et 
al, Agricultura e Politicas Publicas Brasileiras, Brasilia: IPEA, pp. 113-221 
(serie IPEA no. 127). 
LIMA, J. P. (1987) Estado e Agroindustria Canavieira no Nordeste: A 
Acumulagao Administrada, in Anais do XV Encontro Nacional da ANPEC. 
Salvador: Associagao Nacional de Posgradagao em Economia (ANPEC). 
MARION, B. W. (1985) The Organization and Performance of the U.S. Food 
System (Report NC 117/USDA). Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books. 
MAUNDER, P. (1983) 'Competition Policy in the Food Industry', in 
BURNS, J., McINERNEY, J. and SWINBANK, A. (eds.), The Food 
Industry - Economics and Politics. London: Heinemann. 
MULLER, G. (1980) Estrutura e Dinamica do Complexo Agroindustrial 
Brasileiro. Unpublished PhD dissertation, Universidade de Sao Paulo. 
MULLER, G. (1981) O Complexo Industrial Brasileiro. Sao Paulo: 
Fundagao Getulio Vargas (Research Paper no. 13). 
NIELSEN AVALIA (1990) 'Mercado internacional e destacapotencial latino 
americano'. Report Nielsen Servi<?os de Marketing, Sao Paulo. 
OECD (1992) Biotechnology, Agriculture and Food. Paris: OECD. 
PADIS, P. C. (1977) 'Agricultura e Subdesenvolvimento', in PADIS, P. C. 
AmericaLatina. Cinquenta anos de Industrializagao. Sao Paulo: Hucitec, pp. 
219-241 
PAIM, G. (1957) Industrializagao e Economia Natural. Rio de Janeiro: 
ISEB-MEC (Textos Brasileiros de Economia No. 1). 
PEREZ, R. and ONCUOGLU, S. (1990) 'Les Operations Structurelles des 
Grands Groupes Agro-Alimentaires', Economie et Gestion Agro-Alimentaire 
(Paris), no. 17, October, pp. 26-32. 
PETRONE, M.T.S. (1968) A Lavoura Canavieira em Sao Paulo: Expansao 
eDeclinio (1765-1851). Sao Paulo: Difel. 
PINASSI, M. O. (1987) Do Engenho Central a Agroindustria: O Regime de 
Fornecimento de Canas. Sao Paulo: CEDEC (Cadernos CEDEC No. 27). 
PIRES, E. and BIELSCHOWSKI, R. (1978) 'Estrutura Industrial e 
Progresso Tecnico na Produgao de Laticinios', in Dois Estudos sobre 
Tecnologia de Alimentos. Brasilia: IPEA (Serie Monografica no. 27). 
PRADO Jr., C. (1970) Historia Economicado Brasil. Sao Paulo: Brasiliense. 
(12th edition). 
RAMA, Ruth (1992a) Investing in Food. Paris: OECD. 
RAMA, Ruth (1992b) 'Tecnologia Endogena, Tecnologia Exogena', in 
RODRIGUEZ ZUNIGA, M. (ed.). (1992) El Sistema Agroalimentario ante 
el Mercado JJnico Europeo. Madrid: Ministerio de Agricultura, Pesca y 
Alimentacion, Editorial NEREA, pp. 59-79. 
RAMOS, P. (1983) Urn Estudo da Evolugao e da Estrutura da Agroindustria 
Canavieira no Estado de S. Paulo (1930/1982). Unpublished MA 
disssertation, Escola de Administragao de Empresas de Sao Paulo da 
Funda<?ao Getulio Vargas. 
RANGEL, I. (1962) A Questao Agraria Brasileira. Recife: Comissao de 
Desenvolvimento Economico de Pernambuco. 
RASTOIN, J. L. and ALLAYA, M. C. (1990) 'Les Multinationales de 
1'Agro-Alimentaire a la Fin des Annees 80: rimperatif de la Mondialisation', 
Economie et Gestion Agro-Alimentaire, no. 17, October, pp. 21-25. 
REISS, G. (1983) 'O Crescimento da Empresa Industrial na Economia 
Cafeeira, Sao Paulo', Revista de Economia Politica, Vol. 3, No. 2 (1983). 
RITSON, C., GOFTON, L. and McKENZIE, J. (1986) The Food Consumer. 
Chichester: John Wiley & Sons. 
RODRIGUEZ ZUNIGA, M. and GUTIERREZ, R. S. (1992) 'La 
Articulation de las Diferentes Etapas del Sistema Agroalimentario: Situacion 
y Perspectivas', in: RODRIGUEZ ZUNIGA, M. (ed.), El Sistema 
Agroalimentario ante el Mercado Unico Europeo. Madrid: Ministerio de 
Agricultura, Pesca y Alimentacion, Editorial NEREA. pp. 15-34. 
SILVA, S. (1976) Expansao Cafeeira e Origens da Industria no Brasil. Sao 
Paulo: Alfa-Omega. 
SUZIGAN, W. (1986) Industria no Brasil. Sao Paulo: Brasiliense. 
SZMERECSANYI, T. (1986) O Plane]amento da Agroindustria Canavieira 
no Brasil (1930-1975). Sao Paulo: Hucitec-Unicamp. 
TAVARES, M. C. (1977) 'Auge e Declinio do Processo de Substituigao de 
Importagoes no Brasil\ in TAVARES, M. C., Da Substituigao de 
Importagoes ao Capitalismo Financeiro. Rio de Janeiro: Zahar (6th edition). 
TAVARES, M. C. (1992) 'Ajuste e Reestruturagao nos Paises Centrais', 
Economia e Sociedade (Campinas), no. 1, pp. 21-58. 
WILKINSON, J. (1992) 4La Biotecnologia y el Sistema Agroalimentario: 
Impactos en la Reorganization de las Fases de Production y 
Transformation', in: RODRIGUEZ ZUNIGA, M. (ed.), El Sistema 
Agroalimentario ante el Mercado Unico Europeo. Madrid: Ministerio de 
Agricultura, Pescay Alimentation, Editorial NEREA, pp. 81-110. 
WILLIAMSON, O. E. (1985) The Economic Institutions of Capitalism -
Firms, Markets, Relational Contracting. New York: The Free Press. 
Papers in this series may be obtained from the 
INSTITUTE OF LATIN AMERICAN STUDIES 
31, Tavistock Square, London WC1H 9HA 
Price per copy, including postage: 
Vols 1-20 
United Kingdom and Europe £3.50, Overseas (airmail) £5.00 (US $11.50) 
Vols 21-
United Kingdom and Europe £4.50, Overseas (airmail) £7.00 (US $14.00) 
Please make cheques payable to The University of London 

